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1. Introduction 
A striking feature of contemporary biology is the prominence of semantic concepts, especially 
concepts that have to do with information and communication.  Biologists speak of codes and signals, 
transcription and translation, even of editing and proof-reading. Such notions have a home in 
descriptions of interactions among intentional agents, but they are nowadays routinely invoked in 
descriptions of metabolism, physiology and development. Recent decades have seen great strides in our 
understanding of the chemical and physical basis of life, but the tendency to view biological processes 
through an informational lens has anything but subsided. This is a puzzling situation: What is biological 
information? What does it mean to say that cells communicate or that molecules are signals? Does the 
appeal to informational notions have a genuine theoretical role in biology, and if so what is it?  
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Increasingly over the past decade or so, philosophers and philosophically-minded biologists have 
discussed these questions (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny, 2008, provide a recent review). For the most part, 
debate has centered on the role of inherited information in developmental biology – the common but 
controversial idea that genes code for or supply information for the making of an adult. Information and 
related notions are certainly prominent in developmental genetics, but appeals to such notions occur 
regularly in other parts of biology.  The role of non-genetic factors in development, the activity of 
hormones in adults, the exchange of factors between nearby cells – I discuss these examples below – as 
well as a variety of other cell-level processes are typically explained in terms of signaling and 
communication.  
The central goal of this paper is to provide a general view of informational notions in biology, one 
that takes into account their full range of application.  The account I'll develop is a fictionalism of sorts, 
but one that is intended to illuminate the function of informational concepts in biology rather than 
deflating them. On the one hand I claim that given the range and character of appeals to informational 
notions, the most plausible interpretation is that they are fictional – metaphors rather than descriptions 
that are grounded in genuine semantic properties of cells and macromolecules. However, I will also 
argue that appeals to information bear theoretical weight by allowing us to reason via a fiction about real 
causal properties. On this view, invocations of information in biology are not literal descriptions but 
they are not rhetorical flourishes either.  They play a genuine role in biological understanding. 
One important feature of informational language in biology is that its fictional status often passed 
undetected. Informational language is what we might call a liminal metaphor – one that operates near the 
threshold of the noticeable. Liminality is not an uncommon feature of metaphorical language, especially 
in science. It can have utility when the goal of metaphorical description is not primarily aesthetic. By 
backgrounding the fact that one is not talking literally one gains a better grip on the insights provided by 
a metaphor. Nevertheless, I suspect that liminality accounts for some of the confusion surrounding 
 3 
information, and for mistaken interpretations of molecular biology, on which I comment at the end of 
the paper. In this regard, I shall attempt to walk a tight line between taking information seriously as 
playing a real theoretical role and refraining from taking it too seriously by assigning it a foundational 
status in biology. 
Such a stance raises questions about the status of non-literal devices in science more generally. 
While a direct engagement with these questions goes beyond the scope of the present discussion, I think 
it is an important and largely neglected fact that there is a spectrum of literality in scientific discourse, 
and that a concept‘s position on this spectrum matters. A secondary goal of this paper is to call attention 
to a class of scientific concepts that resides somewhere in between the fully literal and the merely 
ornamental.     
I begin, in the next section, by reviewing the main themes of the existing debate over information. 
Section 3 describes some cases of informational explanations outside of genetics. In sections 4 and 5, I 
argue that existing accounts are unable to handle these cases, and I motivate a fiction-based view.  
Sections 6 and 7 describe the account I favor in more detail. In closing, I address ways of taking 
information too seriously, and connect the case of information in biology to the more general issue of 
the role of fictions in science. 
 
2. The State of the Debate 
In thinking about development, professionals and laymen alike commonly treat genes as providing 
the information for adult form. In contrast, other factors are usually thought of as raw materials or as 
background conditions. Susan Oyama‘s book The Ontogeny of Information (1985), prompted a number of 
philosophers to argue that this dichotomy is untenable and that there is no distinct sense in which genes 
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carry developmental information. There seems to be a general agreement that genetic coding, the 
mapping of DNA base triplets onto the amino acids that constitute proteins, is a legitimate and 
important theoretical concept. The critics‘ claim is that a richer, semantic sense of genetic information 
cannot be rescued from biological usage, nor is it necessary for explaining development. Indeed critics 
generally think that appeals to information are detrimental. Sarkar (1996) and Griffiths (2001) have 
argued that lack of care in the use of informational concepts leads to widespread misunderstandings of 
the explanatory structure of molecular biology: It encourages the belief that phenotypes can be ―read-
off‖ genes in a bottom-up manner. Furthermore, some hold that attributing an informational role to 
genes lends spurious support to genetic determinism (Griffiths, 2006).  
There exists a highly developed mathematical theory of information, pioneered by Claude 
Shannon (1948). But most authors who have written on the topic agree that Shannon‘s notion is not the 
relevant one here. It is worth recounting – in a brief and non-technical way – why. Shannon‘s theory 
allows that anything can be a source of information so long as it has a range of distinct states. One state 
carries information about another provided that the two are correlated. Information theorists then say 
that the two states are connected by a channel along which signals are transmitted. Intuitively, an 
information channel allows the receiver to learn about the state of the sender by consulting the signal.  
Information theory provides quantitative measures for the amount of information contained in a signal, 
the capacity of channels, the efficiency of particular coding and transmission schemes and related 
matters. These tools can be useful in biology, especially in bioinformatics, where large amounts of data 
pertaining to genes and proteins are analyzed. But in these contexts the apparatus of information theory 
is used as data analysis tool: Bioinformaticians treat an available data set as carrying information about 
some process or structure of interest – the structure of a protein, for instance, or the topology of a 
regulatory network. They are not using information in an explanatory account, as a way of saying what 
genes do or how they do it.  And for good reason. Genes carry Shannon information but so does any 
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other factor that reliably affects protein structure (such as temperature). Genes may carry more 
information, but if information is understood along Shannon lines,  their role isn't qualitatively different. 
In contrast, the use of informational terminology that is under debate is meant to distinguish genes from 
other developmental factors. Genes are said to carry developmental information whereas food, also a 
crucial ingredient in development, doesn't. In accounting for this explanatory use Shannon‘s notion is of 
no avail.2  
Accepting that Shannon-information isn‘t the way to go, ―advocates‖ of information have mostly 
opted for a teleosemantic account (Sterelny, Smith and Dickison, 1996; Maynard Smith 2000; Sterelny 
2000; Shea 2007). This view seeks to ground inherited information in natural selection. It relies on the 
idea that we can think of products of natural selection as having a function, and furthermore that under 
certain conditions functions can ground ascriptions of content. On the teleosemantic view, genes carry 
information about (or for) the structure they encode in virtue of being selected for producing that 
structure.3  
Of course, many biological structures have a function but are not information carriers – wings are 
for flying but they do not carry information about flying. So some further element has to be added to 
this picture. Maynard Smith (2000) and Sterelny (2000) argue that informational factors are those 
selected structures that exhibit an arbitrary relation to their effects. Modeled after the relation between 
words and their referents, the idea is that to have genuine semantic content the structure of a putative 
signal must be largely unconstrained by the structure of the message; just as the structure of 'table' is 
largely unconstrained by the structure of tables. If the structure of the ‗message‘ is too closely connected 
to the structure of the ‗signal,‘ we have chemistry or physics and not semantics. It is hard to make this 
                                                          
2 Information theory is put to use in some parts of neuroscience, especially in computational neuroscience (Nelson 2007; 
Rieke et al. 1996) but these uses are beyond the purview of the present discussion. 
3 The teleosemantic view can be seen as an instance of a more general teleosemantic theory of content, as developed by 
Millikan (1984) and others. But most authors in the present debate have not explicitly drawn on the more general 
framework. 
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notion of arbitrariness sufficiently clear. One worry is that any effect may seem arbitrary if there are 
enough causal links separating it from some salient cause (Godfrey-Smith, 2000). Another is that the 
kind of contingency that is supposed to ground arbitrariness (especially in the paradigm case of the 
genetic code) isn‘t essentially different from the historical contingency characteristic of any product of 
natural selection (Stegmann, 2004). 
Nicholas Shea (2007) has suggested a more complex teleosemantic view which shifts the locus of 
function to the level of the inheritance system as a whole – in the case of genes, to the function of the 
system of genetic inheritance. Shea argues that informational factors in development are those factors 
that, on an evolutionary time-scale, carry Shannon-information about their outcomes and are elements of 
an evolved system of inheritance. An inheritance system is an evolved structure consisting of a sender, a 
consumer and a range of intermediates that coordinate the states of sender and consumer.  In such a 
system intermediates carry (at least a rudimentary form of) content, and it can give rise to ascriptions of 
information. The heart is not part of an inheritance system so, like most evolved structures, it isn‘t an 
information carrier. Genes, on the other hand, as well as some kinds of non-genetic factors such as 
chromatin marks (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995) are intermediates in an evolved system of inheritance, so 
we can treat them as carriers of inherited information. 
It appears that the teleosemantic view, in one version or another, is the most promising option on 
the table.  But I'll argue it cannot be the whole or even the main story about information in biology.  We 
have seen that the teleosemantic view arises in the context of  genes and development.  As I've noted, 
informational notions occur in many other areas of biology. Paying attention to this broader range of 
cases tells against the teleosemantic account. I'll explain why in section 4; first let me describe a few key 
examples. 
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3. Information Outside of Genetics 
The first example comes from developmental biology, but is not directly related to genes. It 
concerns morphogens and ―positional information‖ (Wolpert, 2006). Many animals exhibit a basic 
division of the body into axes: dorsoventral (back-belly), anterior-posterior (mouth-anus) and lateral 
(left-right). Axis formation is a very early step in the assignment of spatial identities to the body‘s 
different parts. A basic question facing developmental biologists, here as in other early pattern formation 
processes, is: How do different parts of the embryo differentiate in a location-specific manner? Or, as it 
is sometimes put: How do embryonic cells know where they are? One important mechanism involves 
the delivery of positional information by morphogen gradients.  A morphogen is typically a transcription 
factor. Its impact, the particular set of developmental genes that it regulates, depends on its 
concentration in the immediate vicinity of the cell or within it. In axis specification, morphogens act by 
forming a concentration gradient along the relevant axis – e.g., highest near the dorsal end and 
decreasing ventrally. As different genes get transcribed in response to different concentrations of the 
morphogen, cells along the gradient develop into distinct types and an axis is formed.4 Thus, cells know 
where they are because they are sensitive to morphogen concentrations, and these map onto location. 
This important developmental mechanism is typically described by saying that morphogens are signals 
that supply embryonic cells with positional information. 
Next, consider hormones.  Some hormones act in development, but many don't. In explanations 
of hormonal activity the language of information and communication is ubiquitous. Hormones are 
practically defined as signals that coordinate the activity of non-neighboring cells. Typically they are 
produced by a gland somewhere in the body, say in the brain or in the pancreas, then secreted into the 
                                                          
4 This is perhaps the simplest case. Complex gradients, and interactions between the gradient and cell-level activities are 
also important. In addition, responders are sometimes nuclei within a multi-nucleated cell (syncitium) – a common 
situation early in insect development – but the principle is the same. 
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blood stream. Hormones bind to receptors at the target cell and exert their effects, typically metabolic 
regulation, either directly or via modulating transcription. The action of these receptors is often 
described in terms of ―perception‖ or ―interpretation‖.5 Once bound to a receptor, a hormone activates 
a chain of reactions that regulates metabolism either directly or via ―signal transduction cascades‖ that 
affect transcription.  
The last example concerns local cell-cell communication. Gap junctions are molecular ring-shape 
structures that are embedded in membranes, creating a narrow fluid-filled channel that connects the 
cytoplasm of neighboring cells  (Evans et al., 2002) . Gap junctions enable ions and other small 
molecules to diffuse between adjacent cells. Or, as this is often described, they allow signals to travel 
between cells, and information to be shared or transferred (Alberts et al. 2002, 835). Note that gap 
junctions are too narrow for ―sequence‖ molecules such as RNA, enzymes or structural proteins to 
move through them; the signals are typically small charged species such as ions or peptides. Gap 
junctions play a part in coordinating the activities of cells within a tissue by allowing rapid transmission 
of non-genetic signals. 
Though my description of these examples has been brief, I think it enables us to point to two 
important features of the language of communication and information. First, it is ubiquitous, occurring 
in various parts of cellular and molecular biology. DNA and the role of genes in ontogeny are described 
in informational terms, but so are phenomena quite far removed from genes or development. Second, 
information is typically invoked in the course of offering mechanistic explanations. A precise notion of 
mechanistic explanation is not required here (see, e.g. Machamer et al., 2000);  suffice it to note that 
information and related intentional notions usually figure in explanations that show why a certain organ 
                                                          
5 For instance, in a recent review of hormonal regulation of development in plants, Chow and McCourt state that to 
understand the role of simple organic molecules that serve as hormonal signals in plants, ―first requires an understanding 
of how they are perceived‖ (2006, 1998). 
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or cellular structure exhibits a certain property or behavior by describing its internal organization and the 
ordered interaction among its constituent parts. Mechanistic explanation is proximal, i.e. the explanans 
are non-historical facts that have to do with the causal relations between elements of the system being 
explained – it is an explanation that appeals to what‘s ―under the hood.‖  As we shall see in the next 
section, both the ubiquity of informational language and the fact that it is typically employed in 
mechanistic explanations are directly relevant to an evaluation of the teleosemantic view.     
 
4. The Inadequacy of the Teleosemantic View 
Shannon‘s notion will not, as noted, explain the role of informational language in biology. Nor, of 
course, will a simple reference to function: It won‘t distinguish hormones or genes from other evolved 
body parts. This is what drives more sophisticated teleosemantic accounts to posit further conditions. 
The result is to narrow down the list of potential informational factors. But the  sophisticated accounts 
are motivated by cases of inheritance, and it is doubtful that they can be made to fit the wider set of 
cases in which informational descriptions are employed. Shea‘s account requires that the informational 
factors be part of a system of inheritance. But while some morphogens are maternally inherited, others 
are not. Hormones are not typically inherited, and neither are gap-junction-mediated signals. In terms of 
evolved functions, these factors seem more like the heart than the genome. If we turn instead to 
Sterelny‘s and Maynard Smith‘s notion of arbitrariness – which rests on shaky grounds anyway – it is 
unclear whether it applies to the relation between signaling molecules and receptors, often a subtle 
structural match that underlies a specific biomechanical transformation in the receptor. And one may 
worry that the appearance of an arbitrary connection between, say, insulin and the message it carries 
(roughly: increase glucose metabolism) is an artifact of the causal distance – the number of links in the 
causal chain separating them. Nor does it seem that the relation between a flow of ions through a gap 
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junction, and a resultant change in a cell‘s electrical potential, meets the arbitrariness criterion. This is 
unsurprising, as these do not appear to be the kinds of cases Sterelny or Maynard Smith had in mind – 
they were generalizing from features of DNA. 
Another, deeper, source of trouble for the teleosemantic view has to do with the way it portrays 
the type of explanations in which information figures. On the teleosemantic view informational notions 
occur in functional explanations – which proceed by  appeal to what informational factors are for. By 
‗function‘ is meant evolved function, i.e. the effect for which the factor in question was selected.   
Importantly, such functional explanations are distinct from proximal-mechanistic explanations. Shea is 
explicit on this point. He contrasts the role of information carriers according to the teleosemantic 
account with ―stage-by-stage description[s] of the causal processes‖ underlying the phenomenon in 
question (2007, 317). Thus, if the why question addressed by appeals to information is something like: 
‗Why does gene g give rise to protein p?,‘ and the answer given by biologists is that g carries the 
information for p, then on the teleosemantic account this is a way of saying (roughly speaking) that g 
was selected for giving rise to p.6 Similarly, in the case of morphogens the explanation for why a 
morphogen m specifies the dorsoventral axis is said to be that it carries positional information which is 
interpreted by cells. On the teleosemantic account this is a way of saying that m's selected function is to 
cause dorsoventral differentiation. Now, it is very likely true, at least in many cases, that genes and 
morphogens have evolved functions. But it appears that biologists do not use informational notions to 
describe these functions. For the most part, ―stage-by-stage‖ mechanistic descriptions are exactly where 
one finds appeals to communication and information. Genes give rise to proteins in the here and now by 
supplying information in the form of a coding sequence – this is a way of pointing to the properties of 
                                                          
6 On Shea‘s more subtle account this is a way of saying that g is an intermediate in a system of inheritance that carries 
some relevant bit of Shannon-information. The basic point I am making, however, holds for this account too. What 
makes something an inheritance system is its evolved function. Furthermore, the signal carries Shannon-information in 
virtue of correlations that exists on an evolutionary time scale, as Shea emphasizes. 
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genes in virtue of which they play a key part in producing proteins. In saying that morphogens supply 
positional information to embryonic cells, developmental biologists take themselves to be describing the 
mechanism of axis formation (Wolpert et al., 2002, a widely-used developmental biology textbook, is 
very explicit on this point. See pp. 19-20). Furthermore, the evidence sought to confirm that a particular 
morphogen is a positional signal – e.g. that its absence results in abnormal axis formation – also suggests 
that a proximal mechanistic explanation, rather than a distal selection-based one, is at work. Thus, a 
central idea behind teleosemantic accounts, the idea that informational descriptions explain via implicit 
reference to evolved function, seems to ill-match the role information plays in many actual cases.  
Taken together, I think these arguments cast serious doubt on the teleosemantic view. 
 
5. Motivating a Fiction-Based Account 
There are at least three motivations for thinking that informational language in biology should not 
be treated literally. The first lies in the fact that a literal understanding of information does not seem 
forthcoming. Shannon-information is not relevant to the problem, whereas the favored view in the field, 
the teleosemantic view, loses much of its plausibility when the full range and mechanistic character of 
informational discourse comes into view. Of course, it is possible that a different literal account will 
eventually be offered. But as matters stand this does not seem likely. 
Second, as Alexander Rosenberg (1986, 2006) has noted, ascriptions of information in biology 
appear, at least in some cases, to differ from ordinary intensional contexts in that they are not opaque: 
They allow truth-preserving substitution of co-referring terms. Rosenberg makes this claim as part of a 
defense of a reductionist, gene-centered view of development. Questions about reductionism are largely 
orthogonal to the present discussion, but I think Rosenberg‘s observation can be recruited for my 
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purposes as well. It suggests that the description of genes (and possibly other factors) as content-bearing 
is a thin one, and not a full-blown ascription of intentional properties. 
The third motivation is textual: The wording of explanations invoking information often suggests 
that information is used non-literally. As an illustration, consider the following quote from Alberts et al., 
the ―king‖ of cell biology textbooks. The authors review the activity of Dorsal, a morphogen that 
specifies the dorsoventral axis in Drosophila. They sum-up by stating:  
Thus, the regulatory DNA can be said to interpret the positional signal provided by the Dorsal 
protein gradient, so as to define a dorsoventral series of territories – distinctive bands of cells that run 
the length of the embryo (2004, 1184; italics in the original). 
Notice how informational language is hedged by the use of italics, and by the phrase ―…can be 
said to.‖ Such a tone is not uncommon, although rarely is a non-literal interpretation made explicit. This 
strongly suggests that something akin to a metaphorical mode of description is being employed. 
 
This situation is not surprising – taking information talk to be non-literal is, in a way, the most 
natural way to take it. After all, why attribute to submicroscopic molecular structures the ability to mean 
anything, let alone to send and receive messages? The puzzle arises because biologists commonly talk 
this way, and appear to be talking seriously. Both observations, I think, are true: Information-talk is 
serious but it isn‘t literally true. On the account I'll offer, explanations involving information operate 
indirectly via a fiction. The activity of genes, hormones, morphogens and other factors is described as if 
it were a process of communication in which a sender transmits a signal that regulates a receiver‘s 
behavior. Informational descriptions are telling us something about the causal role that genes, for 
instance, or morphogens, play. But they do so not by attributing full-blown intentional and semantic 
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properties to cells and molecules, but by using a schema associated with information and its 
communication (in their ordinary senses) so as to bring to the fore coarse-grained causal properties of 
the processes in question.  
 Since it is used in a fictional mode, the decision to apply an informational description is not a 
forced one: Genes or hormones are not objectively signals. However, the causal features which 
informational language provides access to are not fictional. The following sections will flesh out this 
fictionalist view in several steps. 
 
6. The Pretense Theory of Fiction 
An attractive way of understanding fiction and metaphor is found in Kendal Walton‘s pretense 
theory of fiction (Walton, 1990). Walton‘s theory is primarily aimed at explaining representational art, 
but it can be extended and applied to cover other fiction-involving uses of language such as metaphor 
and idiom (Walton, 1993; Egan, 2008). For present purposes I will not attend to the distinction between 
metaphor and related kinds of fiction (and I'll use the terms interchangeably). All we need is a way of 
understanding how a non-literal use of language allows one to track real, true facts. 
The pretense theory models fiction on games of make-believe of the sort played by children – 
directed acts of the imagination, often coordinated among several individuals. In such games there is a 
set of rules – often implicit – that determines what is to count as true in the game. Walton calls these 
‗principles of generation.‘ Principles of generation instruct participants what it is that they are to pretend 
when playing the game. In particular, principles of generation often specify what one is to imagine in 
response to certain non-fictional facts. In the game of cops and robbers, for instance, there is a principle 
of generation that implies that if I point my index finger at you, my thumb sticking out and the 
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remaining fingers folded, while exclaiming ―bang bang‖, then, fictionally, I have shot you. If we are 
pretending that clouds are animals, then the shape of a cloud in the sky might make it the case that a 
reindeer is approaching. Thus, what‘s true in the fiction may depend, in quite particular ways, on facts in 
the non-fictional world because the relevant principles of generation specify what participants in the 
game are to imagine in response to such facts.  
One important upshot of this is that one can learn real-world facts by consulting fictions. If we 
are imagining that tree stumps are bears and you say ―wow, check out that huge bear,‖ I can infer, 
without bothering to look, that there is a large tree stump around. Some metaphors work this way too:  I 
may describe Italy as a boot in order to indicate that Lecce is on the heel. Or, to choose an example 
closer to the present discussion, I might think of an organism‘s phenotype as lying in a fitness valley in 
order to reason about available evolutionary possibilities. In such cases, the fiction is constructed so that 
what is fictionally true corresponds to what is true simpliciter.  Since the fiction employs a familiar set-
up that makes it easier to handle, we use an indirect route and make fictional statements as a way of 
reasoning about the real world. To use a tracking metaphor, we use a fictional set-up to track non-
fictional truths.  
Information in biology, I propose, is a pretense of exactly this kind. Biologists metaphorically 
describe molecules and cells as engaged in communication and information sharing.  Such descriptions 
invoke games of make believe in which participants are to imagine the relevant elements – genes, 
hormones, cells or whole organs – as if they were sending and receiving messages. Correctly read, this is 
a way of saying what these elements really are doing. Moreover, applying an informational schema is a 
way of organizing the causal facts and highlighting particular aspects of a process that have explanatory 
significance. The pretense is valuable because it enables one to compactly describe and reason about 
these explanatory facts.  The next section will explain which types of causal facts I have in mind and 
how an informational description organizes them. 
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7. The Theoretical Role of Information 
There is a generic kind of explanatory context in biology where one wishes to understand how the 
activity of one cell or structure is regulated by a distinct cell or structure, typically in a complex and 
adaptive manner. It is in these regulation contexts that one often finds informational language. For 
instance, many biology texts describe (up)regulation of glucose metabolism in something like the 
following way. Insulin is a signal that originates in the pancreas by a mechanism that is sensitive to 
increases in the concentration of glucose; it informs muscle cells that the level of glucose in the blood is 
high, and directs them to up-regulate the breakdown of glucose in response. On the present account this 
is a way of describing the coarse-grained causal structure of hormonal action by means of a metaphor 
according to which pancreatic β-cells communicate with muscle tissue as if the two were intentional 
agents. We are familiar with the general features of such interactions and have facility in reasoning with 
them. Likewise with morphogens, in gap-junction mediated signaling and in DNA transcription (I‘ll 
return in more detail to these cases below). Invoking an informational pretense consists in treating one 
element of a causal interaction as a sender, another as a recipient and an intermediate factor as a signal 
that informs the recipient of some state and/or induces in it an appropriate response.7  
In particular, an informational description typically foregrounds a causal pattern with the 
following features: 
Directionality. Communication involves designating a sender, a receiver and a direction of 
influence – from sender to receiver. The directionality in question might be spatial or temporal (most 
often, both). In biological cases signaling often occurs across an external-internal border, where the 
recipient, at least, lies within some enclosed space such as a nucleus, a cell or a particular organ.  But in 
genetic regulation and in some cases of local positive or negative feedback loops, one spatiotemporal 
                                                          
7 The distinction between a descriptive representation and an imperative one may be blurry or even nonexistent in 
simple types of communication systems (Millikan, 1995).  
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part of a process or entity might signal to another – like writing on one‘s hand as a reminder to a future 
self. Thus treating some process as an instance of communication typically involves describing the 
location in time or space of the sender and implies that causal influence runs in a particular direction. 
Connecting variation. Communication is a way of maintaining a correspondence between variable 
states of two distinct parts of a system – the receiver changes state as a function of a change on the 
sender‘s end. Moreover, it does so in a pre-specified manner, according to what may be thought of as a 
rule of interpretation. Thinking in terms of an interpretive rule allows one to focus on the connection 
between the changes at the ends of the causal chain while de-emphasizing intermediate links. An 
informational description of hormones may highlight the connection between the level of a nutrient and 
metabolic activity by describing metabolizing cells as interpreting the hormonal signal according to a rule 
that specifies (e.g.) to elevate metabolism in response to a decrease in signal molecules. Such a 
description brackets much of the underlying detail of how the correspondence is maintained, but it gains 
a transparency in pointing to how an overall systematic connection is achieved.   
Active vs. passive. Designating a certain process as involving communication or information 
transfer serves to highlight the active character of sender and receiver versus the passive character of the 
signal.  Active and passive here are used  metaphorically, I suppose. I intend them to refer to those parts 
of the system that undergo substantial change in contrast to those that stay relatively static. Knowing 
which parts of a system do not change is often very informative. 
The activity of hormones illustrates this picture nicely. Typically, hormonal signaling molecules are 
sent by a gland in one part of the body, say in the brain or the liver. The signal is carried by the blood 
stream to its destination. Once bound to the recipient it either activates a ―secondary messenger‖ or 
enters the cell itself, up- or down-regulating metabolism. Hormone molecules remain relatively 
unchanged in the process whereas the gland and the target tissue change states. Describing this as if it 
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were a case of signaling singles out the variation in the state of the sender (or the bodily parameter it is 
sensitive to, such as nutrient level) and how a corresponding metabolic activity occurs on the receiving 
end. 
The morphogen case has a similar structure. The positional signal travels across the cell membrane 
(often, across the nuclear membrane as well) inwards to the receiver. It connects variation in the cell‘s 
location with changes in developmental fate. Metaphorically, this is described as the morphogen informing 
the cells as to their location, and the cells employing an interpretion rule to differentiate accordingly.8 The 
fictional description tends to portray the morphogen as static while responding cells undergo substantial 
change. 
DNA transcription shares some important features with hormones and morphogens, although it 
is a case somewhat unto itself. A signal in the form of a coding sequence is sent from the nucleus to the 
ribosomal machinery in the cell cytoplasm (or on the exterior of the nucleus). The ribosome then 
synthesizes a protein on the basis of the sequence, interpreting it in accordance with the genetic code. 
Here too the sequence stays largely intact while the ribosome is active, and here too there is 
correspondence between variation in sequence and the activity of the ribosome. But there are 
differences. The main one is that in the case of DNA it is not entirely clear who the sender is. Indeed it 
is not clear that there is a sender. We could designate the DNA itself as the sender and mRNA as the 
signal.  But that would be to over-emphasize the differences between these molecules. We could speak 
of parents – or ancestors more generally – as senders. To some extent this might capture the role of 
inherited factors in development.9 But treating ancestors as senders does not seem correct in the case 
DNA transcription in adults. It appears that the role of the sender is less significant in this case. Perhaps 
                                                          
8 For some very explicit uses of this language see Gurdon & Bourillot, 2001; Ashe & Briscoe, 2006 
9 But not fully: maternally inherited proteins, morphogens included, are often contrasted with genetic material in being a 
form of maternal control over development. 
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this is because the signal is maintained in the cell throughout its life and used continuously. It appears 
more appropriate, within an informational description, to treat DNA as a repository of information and 
not so much as a sender, and indeed it is often so described. Notably, something similar occurs in the 
case of morphogens: The sender is often left unspecified, especially when morphogens are maternally 
transcribed and present in the egg.  No doubt this has something to do with the fact that the sender is 
located, if at all, outside the organism in question. This does not mean that the sender is non-existent 
but perhaps explains why its role is de-emphasized. As it is far and unlocalized it time and space, its state 
is less relevant to understanding the mechanics of the system presently described. At any rate, these 
cases show that informational metaphors have considerable flexibility, and may stray from their 
paradigmatic form in a particular explanatory context. 
Apart from foregrounding causal features of a specific biological system, informational 
descriptions have a bridging role too. As Jablonka (2002) emphasizes, describing a variety of systems – 
genes, hormones, morphogens – as engaged in information transfer allows one to compare and contrast 
their overall causal structure and behavior: what is the character of the signal, how is it sent, how does it 
exert its end-state effect, etc. These comparisons are useful in formulating hypotheses, conceiving of 
possible mechanisms, and communicating the big-picture among peers and in pedagogical contexts.  
I have provided some indications of when informational language occurs and which features of a 
causal process it highlights. But it should be stressed that there isn‘t, on my view, a set of conditions 
under which informational language is uniquely appropriate. Many biological processes can be 
shoehorned into an informational mold – digestion could, if one really wanted, be described as a process 
in which food molecules are a signal received by the digestive tract. But biologists do not describe 
digestion this way. It is not easy to say why the language of information and communication is applied in 
some contexts and not in others. One could focus on cases of regulation or control, but I doubt that 
‗regulation‘ can be defined in a satisfying manner. Presumably, there is a mixture of reasons underlying 
 19 
the decision to employ an informational description. To some extent it has to do with the structure and 
complexity of the phenomenon, but pragmatic considerations surely play an important role too. 
Sometimes those aspects that are highlighted by an informational description are not the ones we care to 
highlight. Sometimes they are uninteresting, or already well-understood.  These are good reasons but 
they mostly have to do with the interests of scientists rather than with objective properties of organisms.  
That said, it is important to distinguish the reasons for opting for an informational set-up from 
the status of statements made within it. Once an informational description is found to be helpful and is 
put to use, there are definite standards of correctness within the fiction it invokes. These standards are 
answerable to the real features of the process being described. In glucose regulation the pancreas (and 
not the adrenal or pineal glands) is the sender; muscle cells (and few if any other cell types) are receivers; 
insulin (not one of the hundreds of other hormones in our body) is the signal; and the message is: 
‗glucose levels are up, break glycogen‘ (and not, say, ‗increase heart rate and reduce digestion‘). This is 
significant, for it shows that once a specific informational framework is in place, it allows us to capture objective 
properties of the process in question. If one treats the process by which the pancreas controls glucose 
metabolism in informational terms, one is then obliged to designate the pancreas as a sender, insulin as 
the signal and so on. In other words, one may choose to view the process as an instance of intra-bodily 
communication, but it is not up to one what (informational) description the various elements should 
then receive. This is because the informational language serves as a way of pointing to the real (literally 
true) causal roles of those elements – the directionality of the process and other features described 
above. These features are independent of one‘s choice of whether to employ an informational fiction, 
and they place constraints on claims made within it.  Thus, while informational fictions are put to use on 
pragmatic and cognitive grounds, once they are invoked there is a right and a wrong in using them. In 
this sense, although biological information isn‘t, as it were, really out there, employing a fiction 
according to which what is out there is sending and receiving messages is a way of tracking the real 
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causal goings-on.  
 
8.  Taking Information Too Seriously 
My fictionalist proposal is motivated by the idea that even if we treat information non-literally we 
may still take it seriously and assign it a real role in biological understanding. But we shouldn‘t take it too 
seriously. If information is a metaphor then it is, after all, untrue that cells and molecules bear semantic 
content. Let me comment on two issues where this makes a difference. 
The ―metaphysics‖ of information. 20th-century molecular biology is sometimes taken to have 
made a fundamental ontological discovery, namely that genes and other informational factors constitute a 
distinct kind of entity populating the world. Indeed several eminent biologists have expressed such an 
attitude, suggesting a metaphysical split of sorts between the informational and the chemico-physical. 
G.C. Williams, for instance, speaks of a ―codical domain‖ which exists alongside the material one.10 In a 
similar vein, John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmary (1999) — in a nontechnical, more reflective 
version of their seminal work on major transitions in evolution – speak of ―the dual nature of 
life…metabolic and informational‖ (p.11), and suggest that advances in molecular biology have given us 
a handle not only on inheritance and development, but also on metaphysics (they tie their discussion to 
the ideas of Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz).  Sydney Brenner, pioneer of molecular biology and Nobel 
laureate, has made similar claims.  For instance, he states that in biological systems ―in addition to flows 
of matter and energy, there is also flow of information‖ (1999, 1964). 
For the most part, these claims about the ontological status of information are not defended in 
                                                          
10 Williams sometimes speaks of ―codices‖ as separate kinds of entities, at other times he seems to think of them as 
arising from a distinct level of description, and hints at a multiple realizability argument to buttress this idea (1992, ch. 2). 
If anything, this unclarity strengthens the present point. 
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detail. Information is accorded a prominent role in describing a total worldview, and the justification 
appears to lay in the prominence of informational notions within the practice of molecular and cellular 
biology. From a philosophical point of view, the justificatory gap is evident, and it is hard to shake the 
feeling that these biologists take an over-serious attitude toward information. If some form of material-
informational dualism is a plausible view, it is not because of recent molecular biology. However, if one 
accepts that informational things exist – as, in some form or other, it appears a literal reading of 
information implies – then it is difficult to say why. The fiction-based view explains what is wrong with 
a metaphysics of information, and obviates the inference from the theoretical role of informational 
descriptions to the existence of informational ―things‖. Informational notions have theoretical 
significance, but this should not lead us to reify them. Describing hormones or DNA as if they are 
involved in informational transactions facilitates causal understanding. Williams, Maynard Smith and 
other information enthusiasts are illicitly taking the cognitive success of information as the basis for an 
ontological commitment. 
Information and genetic determinism. Oyama (1985), Griffiths (2006) and others have criticized 
appeals to information in biology, in part out of a concern that informational discourse lends spurious 
support tor genetic determinism.  Griffiths, for instance, thinks that describing genes in terms of 
information and communication tends to bring with it unwelcome inference habits. For example, he 
holds that viewing something as content-bearing leads us to neglect the context sensitivity of its effects. 
In the genetic case, the thought is that treating genes as carriers of messages obscured the fact that the 
content of this supposed message depends (so Griffiths thinks) as much on the environment as on the 
specific features of the gene – its sequence etc. Now, perhaps there is some truth to the observation that 
we tend to treat semantic content as context-insensitive. But I think the kind of inferences we are 
inclined to make when describing something as having content depends greatly on the status of that 
description. Physicists occasionally speak of particles in intentional terms (―the particle doesn‘t know 
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where it came from, it only cares about its present interactions‖), but such locutions, while helpful at 
times, are clearly metaphorical. They do not tempt us to outlandish conclusions about the mental states 
of particles. Similarly, once we take a clear stance according to which informational locutions in biology 
are fictional,11 our inclination to make some of the bad inferences that Griffiths and Oyama warn against 
should be weakened at the very least.  One may resist genetic determinism while rejecting the inference 
from information to the inevitability of what‘s in the genes. 
 
9. Conclusion 
My argument has been that in biology the language of information and communication is a liminal 
fiction, one that often escapes notice, but that it nonetheless bears theoretical weight by tracking a 
certain class of causal facts. It is this cognitive function that makes information and its cognates valuable 
concepts that contribute to biological understanding, and it is the generic character of the explanatory 
contexts in which they figure and their flexibility that accounts for their persistence and wide range of 
application.  Now, to some readers the very notion that a fictional description could bear theoretical 
weight, or could be said to have explanatory value, will be hard to swallow. My response is that scientists 
employ a range of reasoning strategies that involve imagining away some elements of reality or 
pretending that things are different than they actually are: idealizations, simplifications, approximations. 
So long as we can make sense of their cognitive and epistemic contributions to scientific understanding 
(as I have endeavored to do in section 7), I see no in-principle grounds for excluding fictions and 
metaphors from the proper conceptual toolkit of science.   
Philosophers of science often assume, sometimes implicitly, that scientific concepts come in two 
                                                          
11 In the biological case the intentional discourse is more common and more central than in the physical case. 
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flavors – the literal, ontologically committing concepts, and the ―merely‖ metaphorical ones that play an 
unimportant aesthetic role. My hope is that this discussion of information shows that there are scientific 
concepts that stand mid-way between the fully literal and the merely ornamental – concepts that have 
theoretical significance, but function indirectly via a pretense. Other examples come to mind – the 
treatment of energy as a ―stuff‖ that can be transmitted, consumed or conserved; or the idea that natural 
selection is a force (as in ―selection pressure‖) – but there might be interesting differences between these 
cases. 
Some recent work has suggested that fiction plays a central role in the context of scientific 
modeling (Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Frigg, forthcoming) and it would be informative to connect fictions of 
the sort I have discussed to these more regimented, mainstream uses of the imagination in science. The 
use of fictions in science raises many interesting questions, which I shall leave for another day. But it 
should be noted that an acknowledgement of the possibility of ―serious‖ non-literality in science is by no 
means a blanket psychologization of explanation nor does it necessarily open the door for an overly 
permissive attitude towards standards of rational evaluation of scientific concepts. Acknowledging 
fictions is taking seriously the thought that as science is a cognitive enterprise, it will have recourse to 
representational devices that serve the cognitive ends of its makers and consumers.  At the same time, it 
suggests that we have to be very cautious in making inferences from the fact that some set of concepts is 
theoretically valuable to philosophical conceptions about the structure of the natural world. 
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